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COMMENTS
PYRAMIDING OF INSURANCE COVERAGE UNDER
THE STANDARD FAMILY AUTOMOBILE
LIABILITY POLICY
I.

INTRODUCTION

Increased consumer buying has focused on the automobile industry
and as a result "[t]he U.S., with its 60 million families and 100 million
cars, is fast approaching the reality of two cars in every garage."' Paralleling this growth, the insurance industry has made it highly convenient for
the head of a household to insure more than one automobile under the
same policy. A commonly issued form policy which provides such coverage
is the Standard Family Automobile Liability Policy. 2 Ordinarily, insurance protection for a second automobile is provided a policyholder for his
payment of an increased premium. Although this procedure appears to be
a simple, straightforward approach to insuring a family's second automobile, the payment of the additional premium in conjunction with confusing
provisions within the Family Policy have in some cases enabled the insured
to obtain compensation the insurer never intended.
In recent years, policyholders owning two or more automobiles insured
under the same policy have attempted to increase the sum recoverable
under their policies to an amount equal to the monetary limit of coverage
multiplied by the number of automobiles insured. This practice is referred
to in the insurance industry as "pyramiding of coverage." The basis for
this practice has been the separability clause in the Standard Family Automobile Liability Policy. This clause reads in pertinent part: "When two
or more automobiles are insured hereunder the terms of this policy shall
apply separately to each . .

. ."

The contention of an insured who attempts

to pyramid his coverage is essentially that, when two or more automobiles
are insured under the same policy, the language of the separability clause
means that the stated limit of coverage, being a term of the policy, should
be applied separately to each car, i.e., should be multiplied by the number
1. TIME, Dec. 27, 1968, at 51.
2. See pp. 280-81 infra. The Standard Family Automobile Liability Policy is a
form policy drafted by an association of automobile insurance carriers commonly
known as the "Bureau Companies." This group consists of the majority of automobile
insurance companies. They belong to one of three associations: The National Bureau
of Casualty Underwriters, the National Automobile Underwriters Associations, and
the Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau. Elliott, The Family Automobile Policy, 37
NEB. L. REv. 581 n.1 (1958).
3. N. RISJORD & J. AUSTIN, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE CASES, STANDARD
PROVISIONS AND APPENDIX 208 (1964) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as RISJORD].

(279)
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of cars insured.4 At first blush this contention may seem absurd; however, on closer analysis of the coverage provisions of an automobile
liability policy, it appears tenable.
Attempts to pyramid have met with varied success depending on the
particular type of insurance coverage in controversy. On the one hand,
under medical payments coverage, there is a split of authority as to whether
pyramiding should be permitted.5 On the other hand, under the personal
injury liability coverage, the cases are unanimously opposed to pyramiding. 6
The ensuing analysis will focus on the cases which have arisen under
the 1958 draft of the Family Policy 7 and which have interpreted the separability clause and its effect on automobile insurance policy terms relating
to medical payments and personal injury liability coverage. In addition,
the effect of the 1963 revision of the Family Policy8 will be discussed.
Finally, because courts have found the Family Policy ambiguous, suggestions for future revisions will be made.
Further, since the ultimate determination of whether to allow pyramiding is based upon an interpretation of the particular policy before the
court, two well established rules for the construction of insurance policies
will be stressed throughout this Comment. First, the policy as written
should be the basic guide for determining what is the amount and type
of coverage intended by the parties to the insuring contract,9 and second,
ambiguous language should be construed strictly against the insurer and
in favor of the insured.' 0
II.

A.

MEDICAL PAYMENTS

COVERAGE

1958 Family Automobile Policy

In the 1958 draft of the Standard Family Policy, the insuring clause
pertaining to medical payments states that the insurance company agrees
"[tlo pay all reasonable expenses incurred within one year from the date
of accident for necessary medical .. . services .

.

.-"I The persons who

are to receive these benefits are divided into two groups:
Division 1. To or for the named insured and each relative who
sustains bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting
therefrom, hereinafter called "bodily injury," caused by accident, while
occupying or through being struck by an automobile;
4. See, e.g., Central Sur. & Ins. Corp. v.

651, 653 (1963).

Elder, 204

Va. 192, 195, 129 S.E.2d

5. See pp. 280-95 infra. For a collection of the cases, see Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d
900 (1968).

6. See pp. 295-99 infra.
7. RISJORD at 54. The first draft of the Family Automobile Policy was the 1956
version. Since no cases have been found which were decided under that year's policy,
the provisions contained in that version will not be discussed.
8. RiSJORD at 181.
9. 13 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANcE LAW AND PRACTICE § 7402, at 87-97 (1942).
10. Id. § 7401, at 50-87.

11. RISJORD at 62.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol14/iss2/3
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Division 2. To or for any other person who sustains bodily injury,
caused by accident, while occupying
(a) the owned automobile, while being used by the named insured . . . [or another permissive driver] . . . or

(b) a non-owned automobile, if the bodily injury results from (1)
its operation or occupancy by the named insured ... or (2)
its operation or occupancy by a relative ....12

The coverage afforded by Division 1 is extremely broad. It covers the
insured or a member of his family in three different situations: (1) while
he is occupying an owned vehicle, (2) while he is occupying a non-owned
vehicle, and (3) as a pedestrian. Unlike Division 2, wherein coverage
is limited to persons injured by the named insured, his relative, or another
permissive driver, Division 1 makes no distinction between an owned or
non-owned automobile. An exclusionary clause excepts from coverage
under Division 1 any owned automobile not defined in the policy as an
owned automobile. 13
In addition, there is a limitation of liability provision which states:
The limit of liability for medical payments stated in the declarations as applicable to "each person" is the limit of the company's
liability for all expenses incurred by or on behalf of each14person who
sustains bodily injury as the result of any one accident.
The declarations referred to states: "The limit of the company's liability
against each such coverage shall be as stated herein, subject to all the terms
of this policy having reference thereto."' " To date the courts have only
dealt with situations involving "Division 1 persons," either the insured
or a member of his family. In this discussion, situations two and three,
i.e., those involving a non-owned automobile and a pedestrian, will be
analyzed together because, contrary to the owned automobile situation,
there is no exclusionary clause applicable to these situations, and therefore
the contentions which can be made in either of them are applicable to both.
The landmark pyramiding decision is Sullivan v. Royal Exch. Assurance Co. 1 6 In this case the insurer issued to the insured the 1958 version
of the Family Policy insuring two automobiles. The terms of the policy
included medical expense insurance with a $2,000 limit for "each person."
While this policy was in effect, the insured's child was struck by a car
owned by a third person, resulting in expenses in excess of $4,000.17 The
12. Id. at 62-63 (emphasis added).
13. See p. 286 infra.
14. RISJORD at 63 (emphasis added).
15. Id. at 54 (emphasis added).
16. 181 Cal. App. 2d 644, 5 Cal. Rptr. 878 (1960).
17. It is implicit in the pyramiding concept that the insured's damages be in excess
of the policy's stated limit of recovery. The other insurance clause, which is the basis
of this implication, states:
If there is other automobile medical payments insurance against a loss covered
by . . . [the medical payments section] of this policy the company shall not be
liable under this policy for a greater proportion of such loss than the applicable
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insured argued that the separability clause controlled the limit of liability
provision and therefore the $2,000 limitation term of the policy should be
applied separately and individually to each automobile insured under his
policy, thereby providing $4,000 coverage. The court rejected this argument' 8 on the basis of the well established rule that courts should not
indulge in a forced construction of the policy in order to cast liability upon
the insurer if he has not assumed it. 19 Moreover, while the court recognized the basic rule that ambiguities or uncertainties in insurance contracts
should be resolved in favor of the insured, it found no ambiguity, 20 noting
that the intention of the parties should be "gathered from the whole instrument ....-21 The Sullivan court reasoned that the separability and
limit of liability clauses were consistent with each other, rather than contradictory, and that the specific limitation of liability clause under the
medical expenses section should prevail over the general separability clause
22
which applied to all parts of the policy.
In support of this conclusion the court cited Standard Accident Ins.
Co. v. Winget.23 In this case, the insured, while driving his automobile,
struck the plaintiff who sought damages in excess of the limit of recovery
contained in the personal injury section of the policy, but less than the
policy's limit for each accident. The plaintiff argued that the insurer was
liable for damages which were more than the limit set for each person
because the limit for each accident was not reached. Rejecting this contention, the court held that the limitation set for each accident did not
create a fund to be distributed to persons injured by the insured in one
accident, but that the policy read in its entirety, shows distinctly that
24
there is an additional limit set for each person.
The Sullivan court's reliance on Winget appears misplaced since the
clauses before the court in Winget were not as confusing as those in
Sullivan. On this basis, it is submitted that the Sullivan court may have
been too hasty in reaching its decision because the policy before it could
have easily been found ambiguous. Ordinarily, ambiguous insurance conlimit of liability stated in the declarations bears to the total applicable limit of
liability of all valid and collectible automobile medical payments insurance ....
RiSJOR9 at 63. The effect of this clause is to prorate the recovery allowed under any
medical payment insurance, should the damages not reach the total limit of all applicable policies. Thus, the insured is precluded from recovering more than his actual
damages. In a pyramiding context, since courts reach this result by reading the one
policy as two, see p. 283 infra, the same proration would preclude pyramiding if the
damages were not in excess of the policy limits.
18. 181 Cal. App. 2d at 646-47, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 879-80.
19. 181 Cal. App. 2d at 646, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 880, citing New York Ins. Co. v.
Hollender, 38 Cal. 2d 73, 237 P.2d 510 (1951).
20. 181 Cal. App. 2d at 646, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 880, citing Continental Cas. Co. v.
Phoenix Const. Co., 46 Cal. 2d 423, 296 P.2d 801 (1956).
21. 181 Cal. App. 2d at 646, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 880, quoting Ogburn v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 207 Cal. 50, 52-53, 276 P. 1004, 1005 (1929).
22. 181 Cal. App. 2d at 646-47, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
23. 197 F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 1952). The court also discussed another similar case,
Lowery v. Zorn, 184 La. 1054, 168 So. 297 (1936).
24. 197 F.2d at 103.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol14/iss2/3
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tracts should be construed in favor of the insured 25 and the considerations
set forth by the court in Sullivan do not seem of sufficient weight to merit
disregarding that rule of construction. A policyholder could be easily
misled by the language of the 1958 version of the Family Policy. A fortiori,
a determination that language of a policy is ambiguous is not objectionable
as a forced construction of the terms of the insurance contract or as imposing unassurned or unintended liability upon the insurer.
The first case to allow pyramiding in the non-owned or pedestrian
situation involving the insured or a member of his family was Southwestern
Fire & Cas. Co. v. Atkins.26 As in Sullivan, the insured's child was struck
by a third party's car, and the damages sought were in excess of the
stated limit of recovery. The court held that the separability clause when
27
read with the limit of liability clause should provide for double recovery.
As the basis for the court's decision, it adopted the following argument
of the insured. He could collect the stated limit of recovery in his policy
if only one car were insured since the incident for which insurance protection was purchased, i.e., an injury sustained by being struck by a third
person's automobile, had occurred. Furthermore, he had paid an additional premium because two automobiles were insured under the one policy.
If two policies had been in effect, double recovery would be permitted
since both policies would contain provisions insuring against the incurred
lost which was above the limit of a single policy. Therefore, if a double
recovery were not allowed under the single policy in question there would
be no consideration for the additional premium charged for the medical
expense insurance on the second car included in the policy. 28 Moreover,
a double recovery was said to be necessary in this context, because otherwise the insured would suffer a forfeiture of a benefit to which he was
29
entitled under the policy.
Despite this finding the court did not ignore the rule requiring
that insurance policies be read as a whole to determine the coverage
afforded. The insurance company presented an argument based on this
premise in the hope of establishing that the specific limit of liability clause
should control over the general separability clause. The Court of Civil
Appeals of Texas rejected this argument, saying that similar limit of
liability provisions are "commonly placed in such policies where there is
only one car insured. ' 30 Furthermore, the court stated that if the insurance
company intended to restrict its liability under the policy to that applicable
if only one vehicle were insured thereunder, it should have so "stipulated
in no uncertain language, and it should not have charged a premium on
25. See p. 280 supra. See also Kelley v. American Ins. Co., 316 S.W.2d 452
(Tex. Civ. App. 1958), aff'd, 325 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. Sup. 1959) ; Fidelity & Cas. Co.
v. Fratarcangelo, 201 Va. 672, 112 S.E.2d 892 (1960).
26. 346 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
27. Id. at 894.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 895.
Id. University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1969
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each car separately." '31 Since this was not done, the court implied that
the policy when read as a whole could be interpreted by an insured to
provide for double recovery.
One possible criticism may be made of the Atkins opinion. Implicit in
the "no consideration" approach is the fact that the policy is ambiguous.
If the policy were not ambiguous, it would be extremely difficult to justify
the no consideration argument, since the court should then apply the rule
that unambiguous policies should be read for their normal import and, under
this rule, pyramiding would be denied. Thus, the no consideration approach
appears to be a unique, judicially constructed fiction adopted as the primary
reason for allowing pyramiding, rather than a supportive argument to allow
pyramiding once the policy had been found to be ambiguous.
The court in Atkins extended its analysis one step further than the
court in Sullivan. It recognized the rule that the meaning of insurance
policies should be gathered from the entire instrument,3 2 yet presented
a rationale for subordinating the applicability of this rule. The Atkins
court, therefore, cannot be criticized for ignoring a firmly established rule
of construction. Moreover, because it stated this rationale and presented
a logical argument for interpreting insurance contracts to provide for
pyramided coverage, the Atkins decision appears to be better reasoned
than Sullivan.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, in Central Sur. & Ins.
Corp. v. Elder,33 on facts similar to both Sullivan and Atkins specifically
rejected the Sullivan solution and adopted the Atkins rationale.3 4 The
Elder decision sets forth in its facts a clear indication that the Family
Policy, as written, is ambiguous. Soon after Elder's wife had been injured
in an accident, the claim superintendent for the Central Surety & Insurance Corporation informed the insured's lawyer that he, the claim superintendent, believed the policy provided for double recovery.35 As stated
above, it is reasonable to assume that an insured would reach this same
conclusion upon reading his policy. 36
31. Id.
32. See p. 283 supra. See also Travelers Ins. Co. v. Newsom, 352 S.W.2d 888
(Tex. Civ. App. 1961) ; United Serv. Auto. Ass'n v. Miles, 139 Tex. 138, 161 S.W._d
1048 (1942) ; Holland Supply Corp. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 166 Va. 331,
186 S.E. 56 (1936); Mutual Ben. Health & Accident Ass'n v. Ryder, 166 Va. 446,
185 S.E. 894 (1936).
33. 204 Va. 192, 129 S.E.2d 651 (1963).
34. 204 Va. at 197, 129 S.E.2d at 655.
35. 204 Va. at 197-98, 129 S.E.2d at 655.
36. In Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Sweet, 186 So. 2d 95, 96 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1966), a case involving an owned vehicle, the insurance company admitted that
in the non-owned automobile situation it would be "impossible to determine which
automobile afforded coverage" thereby leading to an ambiguity. See also Greer v.
Associated Indem. Corp., 371 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1967), a case involving an attempt to
pyramid liability coverage where the court said that medical payments pyramiding
"does not seem unreasonable in view of the different terminology incorporated in the
insuring agreement of the medical payments provisions which broadly extends coverage
to automobile-produced injuries regardless of its ownership or status as insured or
uninsured." Id. at 34.
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It would appear to follow from this that the Atkins-Elder approach
rather than that adopted in Sullivan is in accord with the established rules
of construction. 37 This does not imply that the insurance companies intended to allow pyramiding in this area - they no doubt intended otherwise38 - but since the policy could be misleading, any possible loss should
fall upon the insurer rather than the insured.
The situation presented by an accident involving an owned automobile raises a more complex problem. Insurance coverage in this context
refers to accidents which involve the named insured or a member of his
family occupying an owned automobile.3 9 Two additional clauses of the
Family Policy heretofore not discussed must be analyzed 40 - the exclusionary clause in the medical payments section and the clause defining
owned automobile. The basic problem in the owned automobile situation,
however, remains the same, i.e., the courts must decide whether to allow
or deny pyramiding by studying the policy before them. Thus, the effect
of the separability clause on the stated limit of liability and the limitation of liability provisions must still be analyzed. It is the additional
consideration of the exclusionary clause and the definition of owned automobile which adds to the complexity of the problem.
In the non-owned automobile situation the courts apparently felt
that there was no way the insured could allocate the limits of liability contained in the policy to either automobile insured because the separability
clause created an ambiguity. 41 Thus, since the insured could be misled
into believing that the policy extended a broader coverage than the insurer
intended, the courts found that the insured would be prejudiced if pyramiding were not permitted. It is submitted that in the owned automobile
37. But see N. RISJORD & J. AUSTIN, 3 AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE CASES,
Case 2734, at 3495-96 (1965), where it was said in an editorial comment on the
Elder case:
The decision was wrong, since the Two or More Automobiles Condition applies
the coverage separately to each of two or more automobiles "insured hereunder",
but has nothing to do with the accident here which involved an entirely separate
automobile that was not "insured hereunder".
Risjord and Austin also criticized the Atkins case, N. RISJORD & J. AUSTIN, 2 AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE CASES, Case 2286, at 3761-62 (1965), and although they
agreed with Sullivan, said: "Perhaps a better reason for justifying it is that the
child was not injured by either automobile insured by the policy so that the provision
that the policy applied separately to each automobile really had nothing to do with
the case." N. RISJORD & J. AUSTIN, 2 AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE CASES,
Case 2032, at 2356-57 (1965).
38. This is made apparent in the Texas State Board of Insurance rules and
regulations relied upon by the insurer in Atkins to show that pyramided coverage
was not intended. "The inclusion of more than one automobile under the policy shall
not operate to increase the limits of the company's liability for the coverage under ...
[the medical payments provision]." 346 S.W.2d at 894.
39. See pp. 280-81 supra.
40. Cf. Vaughn v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 397 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965),
where the Texas court refused to apply Atkins because of a different factual setting.
In Vaughn, although there were two automobiles and two policies, it was argued that
pyramiding should arise. After a discussion of the exclusionary clause, the court
refused to accept this contention. See also Gonzales v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 399 S.W.2d
888 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
41. See note 36 supra.
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situation the exclusionary clause if clearly written could logically be read
to allocate the coverage to one and only one automobile insured under the
policy. This means of allocating coverage to one of the owned automobiles
would obviate pyramiding results because ambiguity would no longer exist.
The exclusionary clause excepts from coverage injuries "sustained by
the named insured or a relative (1) while occupying an automobile owned
by or furnished for the regular use of, either the named insured or any
relative, other than an owned automobile defined herein as an owned
automobile. '42 The definition of an owned automobile is "a private passenger, farm or utility automobile or trailer owned by the named insured,
and includes a temporary substitute automobile. ' 43 Since this clause
merely defines an owned automobile as a vehicle owned by the insured it
is of little help in clarifying the insurer's intent. However, the fact that the
exclusionary clause purports to limit the policy's coverage to only the
specific automobiles designated in the policy as owned automobiles should
not be ignored. 44 If the exclusionary clause effectively carries out its purpose in the context of two owned automobiles insured under the same
policy, the second car could not possibly be a designated automobile unless
a specific premium were paid to include it in the policy coverage. Otherwise, it would not be an owned automobile designated in the policy and
would be excluded from coverage. When an insured pays a second premium
he knows that two automobiles are individually insured, and limits of
liability apply respectively to each. Thus, he should realize when one of
the automobiles is involved in an accident the coverage for the non-involved
vehicle is inapplicable. Furthermore, reliance on the separability clause
would then hinder rather than aid an insured because, by its very import,
the clause should reaffirm the insured's knowledge that the limit of liability
45
term applies separately to each vehicle.
In this area of pyramiding insurance coverage there are two decisions.
Both Travelers Indem. Co. v. Watson46 and Government Employees Ins.
Co. v. Sweet 47 allowed pyramiding but on the basis of conflicting rationales.
The Watson court's basic premise was that notwithstanding the exclu42. RiSJORD at 63.
43. Id. at 58.
44. See, e.g., Travelers Indem. Co. v. Watson, 111 Ga. App. 98, 103, 140 S.E.2d

505, 508 (1965) ; Government Employees Ins. v. Sweet, 186 So. 2d 95, 96 (Fla. Dist.

Ct. App. 1966). The established rule for interpreting the effect of exclusionary
clauses is:
The language used in the exclusion must be taken in its ordinary and usual sense,
and must be given such interpretation as was probably in the contemplation of the
parties when the policy was issued.
Vaughn v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 397 S.W.2d 874, 876 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965). See also
Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Pulsifer, 41 F. Supp. 249 (D.C. Me. 1941); Annot.,
173 A.L.R. 901 (1947). But see Jarrett v. Allstate Ins. Co., 209 Cal. App. 2d 804, 810,
26 Cal. Rptr. 231, 234 (1962), where the court, in discussing the interpretation and
use of exclusionary clauses, said that "[t]he burden rests on the insurer to phrase
such exceptions and exclusions in clear and unmistakable language."
45. See Greer v. Associated Indem. Corp., 371 F.2d 29, 33 (5th Cir. 1967).
46. 111 Ga. App. 98, 140 S.E.2d 505 (1965).
47. 186 So. 2d 95 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
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sionary clause the policy was plain and unambiguous and must be construed
as though two policies, which would provide double recovery, were in
effect. 48 The Sweet rationale was that the limit of liability and the separability clauses were hopelessly irreconcilable, therefore ambiguous and, as
a result, the policy must be construed in favor of the insured. 49
The Watson case involved the construction of a single policy under
which two owned automobiles were insured, and arose from an automobile
accident in which the insured's wife was injured while occupying one of
the two insured automobiles. The court first said that the policy should
be treated as though it were two policies, which treatment would permit
double coverage under a rationale similar to that developed in Atkins.50
Secondly, the court rejected the insurer's argument that the exclusionary
clause would not support this reasoning because that clause should clearly
indicate that only the coverage on one car was available to compensate
the insured. It said that this argument, even if valid, would not apply
to the present situation because the exclusionary clause was not applicable
in this area under the following reasoning. The court recognized that
certain owned automobiles were excluded from the policy's protection.
However, when it analyzed the policy's definition of owned automobile,
it found that the automobile in which the insured's wife was riding was
by policy definition an owned automobile, i.e., it was "a private passenger,
farm or utility automobile . . . owned by the named insured" and, there-

fore, it would not be excluded from the policy's protection even if no
premiums were paid to include it within the policy's coverage. It followed
from this, according to the court, that the exclusionary clause could not
be a basis for refuting a two-policy interpretation. 51
52
The rationale of Watson is more readily criticized than the result.

The court found that the policy was unambiguous; however, the exclusionary clause, because it referred to a meaningless definition of owned
automobile, in effect did not exclude any owned vehicle. But it would be
absurd for the insurance company to insert the exclusionary clause if it
intended the result of Watson. Under Watson, that clause is a nullity
because it only excludes an owned vehicle which is not a "private passenger,
farm or utility automobile or trailer .

. . ."

Thus, it can fairly be said that

the Family Policy as written did not adequately set forth the insurer's
intent. Assuming this to be so, the policy would be ambiguous, and under
the ambiguity rule, a result favoring pyramiding of coverage could be
reached. However, by holding the policy unambiguous, the Watson court
is subject to criticism for not reading the policy logically, but rather in a
"forced" manner.
Ga. App. at 102-03, 140 S.E.2d at 508-09.
So. 2d at 97.
Ga. App. at 102-03, 140 S.E.2d at 508.
Ga. App. at 103-04, 140 S.E.2d at 508-09.
52. But see N. RISJORn & J. AUSTIN, 3 AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE CASES,
Case 3404, at 4392-93 (1965), where it was said that the Watson decision was "an
even worse distortion of the policy" than that of Elder and Atkins.
48.
49.
50.
51.

111
186
111
111
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The theory that the policy's exclusionary clause as written was
ambiguous is supported by American Indem. Co. v. Garcia.53 In this
case the insured was successful in obtaining medical payments coverage
for the vehicle not described in the policy under a policy insuring only
one of two owned vehicles. The court said that the exclusion of the
1958 policy referred to the definition of owned automobile as given in the
policy. However, when they studied this definition, the court determined
that it was broad enough to include all owned automobiles, and, in effect,
acceptance of the insurance company's argument that this clause clarified
the area would require that the language of the exclusionary clause be
changed by judicial construction from, "other than an automobile defined
herein as an 'owned automobile'," to "other than an automobile described
herein as an 'owned automobile'. '54 The court concluded that this could
not be done since a person reading the broad definition of owned automobiles could have neglected to obtain medical payments coverage on his
second car, because it was his understanding that the coverage afforded by
the first automobile policy was sufficient to cover any owned automobile."5
The Garcia rationale appears sounder than that adopted by the court
in Watson. Instead of completely ignoring the ambiguity present in the
exclusionary clause, as did Watson, the court used it as the basis for
deciding for the insured.
The Garcia approach also appears sounder than that used in Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Sweet.56 On facts similar to Watson the
Florida District Court of Appeals in Sweet, citing the Atkins-Elder
ambiguity theory, found that the separability clause was hopelessly in
conflict with the stated limit of liability, thereby providing for double
insurance protection. 57 It rejected the insurance company's argument that
there is no ambiguity in the owned automobile situation. 58 Although the
insurer admitted that the policy was ambiguous in the non-owned or pedestrian situation, he contended that in the owned automobile situation there
is no ambiguity because an insured reading the policy in light of the exclusionary clause would recognize that he was paying an additional
53. 398 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
54. Id. at 147 (emphasis added).
55. Id. But see Gonzales v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 399 S.W.2d 888 (Tex. Civ. App.
1966). In Gonzales a policyholder had both of his automobiles insured under the same
policy, but neglected to obtain medical payments coverage on one car which was
subsequently involved in an accident. The policy had provisions similar to the 1958
Family Policy. However, the court said the policyholder evidenced no intent to obtain
medical payments coverage on the second car and that under the separability clause,
it read the policy as though two separate policies were in effect. Therefore, the
car for which no medical payments coverage was purchased was not covered by the
insurance on the non-involved insured automobile, since it was not described in the
policy. Id. at 890.
It is interesting to note that in both Garcia and Gonzales a writ of error was
refused by the Texas supreme court because they found no reversible error, yet,
the courts reached technically inconsistent results.
56. 186 So. 2d 95 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
57. Id. at 97.
58. Id. at 96.
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premium to obtain coverage for his second automobile,59 and therefore the
policy limits on coverage could now be properly allocated. However, the
court said this was not a realistic reading of the policy since such an
interpretation would mean that the insured paid one premium in order to
obtain coverage when he drove one of his owned automobiles and any
other car in the world except his other owned automobile, whereas he
would be paying the additional premium, which reflected a slight discount
because it covered an additional car under the same policy, in order to
insure only the one additional automobile. 0
Although the result of the Sweet decision appears sound at first glance,
the opinion may be criticized for not rejecting the insurer's argument on
the basis of the rationale of Garciawhere the exclusionary clause was found
ineffective to accomplish its purported purpose.6 1 In addition, the court's
reliance on the Atkins-Elder approach 62 is misplaced because those cases
involved the non-owned automobile situation where the exclusionary clause
is inapposite.
The Watson and Sweet decisions, based on conflicting rationales,
are themselves indicative of the confusion in the pyramiding area. Perhaps
the courts in both cases decided that they should permit pyramiding and
then searched for a justification. Evidence of this possibility may be gleaned
from Chief Justice Feton's opinion in Watson:
If the insured could collect for medical expenses under two policies
insuring different automobiles when the wife was struck by an automobile belonging to some third person, which he can do, he can
certainly do so under one policy, insuring two automobiles, which
contains no provision limiting medical payments to injuries received
while occupying
an insured automobile in which the wife or relative
63
was riding.
Justice Feton then cited the cases which allowed pyramiding in the nonowned automobile situation. The court must have reasoned that it would
be unfair to allow pyramiding when a non-owned vehicle was involved,
yet deny it when an owned vehicle was involved. Moreover, although the
court found the policy unambiguous, it stated:
If the insurance company had decided to exclude payments for injuries received by a wife or relative while occupying any automobile
other than an automobile64 particularly described in the policy, it could
very easily have said so.

59. Id.
60. Id. at 97. In Hilton v. Citizens Ins. Co., 201 So. 2d 904 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1967), the insured unsuccessfully attempted to pyramid his "uninsured motorist"
coverage. The court distinguished Sweet on the basis of a more detailed limitation
of liability clause in the policy before it. Id. at 906.
61. See p. 288 supra.
62. See pp. 283-85 supra.
63. 111 Ga. App. at 104, 140 S.E.2d at 509 (emphasis added).
64. Id. (emphasis added). This reasoning, which stressed the insurance companies'
ability to say clearly what they intended to say, was made more convincing by the case
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This statement appears to warn insurance companies0 5 to state clearly
and succinctly what the intended coverage actually is and, if they use
vague exclusions or definitions to limit recovery, the courts will not effec66
tuate their intent.
In none of the decided cases under the 1958 Family Policy was a
Division 2 person involved, i.e., a person other than a named insured or
a member of his family.67 Of course, such a person could collect only if
he were injured while a named insured, his relative, or another permissive
driver were operating the vehicle. It will be recalled that under this
division a specific distinction is made between the owned and non-owned
automobile situations. 68 This type of treatment in the insuring clause
could result in a significantly different result in the owned, as opposed to
the non-owned, automobile situation. Division 2 specifically mentions the
owned automobile. Thus, it could be argued that this singular language
indicates that the "other persons coverage" is confined to the car which
causes his injuries. It could be said that even though the definition of
"owned automobile" is confusing, this reference to a single car would be
enough to remove the ambiguity in this context, and therefore preclude
pyramiding of coverage. In the non-owned automobile situation, however,
the ambiguity would still appear to be present, since there remains the
problem of determining which automobile's medical payments coverage
should apply to the accident.
B.

1963 Family Automobile Policy

The 1963 Standard Family Automobile Policy, which amended the
1958 policy, has clarified to a degree the intended coverage in the owned
automobile situation of Division 1, yet makes no change which would
of Hansen v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 116 Ga. App. 528, 157 S.E.2d 768 (1967).

Hansen involved an attempt to pyramid medical payments and accidental death benefit
coverage under a policy containing no separability clause. The court did not permit
pyramiding because the limit of liability clause specifically excluded it. However, it
permitted pyramiding of the accidental death benefit coverage, notwithstanding the
absence of the separability clause, because the limitation of liability clause failed to
state a clear limit of recovery. They therefore relied on Watson since accidental
death insurance is similar to medical payments coverage.
65. A possible argument which the insured could raise is that the insurer would
be estopped from excluding coverage by use of the exclusionary clause or limit of
liability clause of the policy. An estoppel argument was unsuccessfully attempted in
Pusti v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 415 Pa. 318, 203 A.2d 660 (1964). The elements
of estoppel set forth in Pusti were:
(1) a policy condition
(2) which policy condition would void the entire policy and frustrate the entire purpose of the insured, and
(3) the insurer's knowledge that the policy condition was inconsistent with the
facts of the insured's situation.
Id. at 323, 203 A.2d at 662; accord, Varvil v. Mutual Ins. Co., 243 Ark. 692, 421
S.W.2d 346 (1967).
66. See Jarrett v. Allstate Ins. Co., 209 Cal. App. 2d 804, 809, 26 Cal. Rptr. 231,
234 (1962), where the court said: "In construing insurance contracts, the standard to
be used is the understanding of the ordinary person."
67. See p. 281 supra.
68. Id.
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clarify the non-owned or pedestrian situation. There were two significant
revisions implemented by the 1963 policy. The insurance provided for the
named insured or a member of his family is still set forth in Division 1;
however, the factual situations covered are now specifically described. The
coverage extends to such persons:
a. while occupying the owned automobile,
b. while occupying a non-owned automobile . . . [or]

c. through being struck by an automobile or by a trailer of any
type .... 69
The definition of owned automobile was also changed to "[a] private
passenger, farm. or utility automobile described in this policy for which a
specific premium charge indicates that coverage is afforded ....-70 This
change eliminates the problem inherent in the 1958 definition of owned
automobile which was broad enough to include any owned vehicle whether
71
described in the policy or not.
The changes made in 1963 will not effectively eliminate the ambiguity
present when the insured is injured while occupying a non-owned vehicle
or is struck by a vehicle. 72 These changes do not meet the requirements
of Atkins, i.e., that the insurer specifically state that it does not intend to
provide for pyramided coverage. Since the policyholder could still interpret the policy as if two policies were written, thereby providing for
pyramided coverage, nothing would warrant the conclusion that now the
policy when read as a whole would set forth in clear and concise language
the insurer's intent.
The 1963 policy, however, does clarify the intended coverage when
the insured is injured while occupying an owned automobile. The one
decision interpreting the effect of the 1963 revisions on the problem of
pyramiding medical payments supports this contention. In Guillory v.
Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 73 the insurance company issued the 1963

policy to cover the insured's two automobiles. While the insured was
driving one of these cars he was involved in an accident, sustaining injuries exceeding in cost the policy's stated limit of recovery. Thus, the
circumstances were similar to those in Watson and Sweet, in that an owned
automobile was involved. The Louisiana Court of Appeals in Guillory
held that the policy did not provide for pyramided coverage. In its
opinion the court relied on the rule that the insurance contract itself is
69. RISJORD at 191.
70. Id. at 185-86 (emphasis added).
71. See p. 287 supra.
72. See Greer v. Associated Indem. Corp., 371 F.2d 29, 34 (5th Cir. 1967), where
the court, while discussing the reasonableness of the cases allowing the pyramiding
of medical payments, said in dicta: "We may assume, without deciding, and as the
recent cases seem to bear out that the 1963 amendments, while altering the terminology
of the medical payments section, do not appear to have significantly affected the broad
coverage afforded."
73. 203 So. 2d 762 (La. Ct. App. 1967).
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the best evidence of the parties intentions, and that if no ambiguity is
present, it should be read for its normal import.74 It reasoned that if the
insured was riding in an owned automobile for which no medical payments
insurance was purchased, he would not be entitled to recover for his injuries since neither an owned automobile, as interpreted in the policy, nor
75
a non-owned automobile was involved in the accident.
Although the court did not discuss the Watson and Sweet decisions,
it is doubtful that they would have been influential since the revisions in
the 1963 draft clearly set forth the intended coverage, which the 1958 draft,
construed in Watson and Sweet, did not. 76 The court referred to the specific
conditions which had to be met before the insurer's liability for payments
arose and impliedly found that the policy's definition of owned automobile
precluded the insured from recovering against the insurer if he was injured
77
while riding in an owned, but uncovered automobile.
As mentioned earlier, there have been no decisions interpreting the
effect of the separability clause on a "Division 2 person," i.e., any other
person injured by the named insured, his relative, or another permissive
driver while any of these people are operating the vehicle. It was previously
determined that under the 1958 policy such a person would have a difficult
task establishing an argument in support of pyramiding if he were injured
by one of the owned automobiles. The only possible basis for allowing
pyramiding was the vague definition of "owned automobile" contained in
the 1958 policy. 78 Since that definition has been clarified in the 1963
policy, such a person would have an even more difficult task. Moreover,
it was determined that when a Division 2 person was in an accident involving a non-owned vehicle, this person could probably establish a successful argument for pyramiding based on ambiguity.79 Since the 1963
policy has not clarified the coverage when a non-owned automobile is in
an accident, there is nothing to change the suggested result.
Although pyramiding could no longer properly be permitted under
the 1963 version of the Family Policy in the owned automobile situation
because no ambiguity would be present, the unfairness, referred to by
the Watson court of allowing pyramiding in the non-owned situation, but
denying it in the owned, remains ° since an ambiguity argument could
still successfully be made to support a pyramiding result in the non-owned
situation. It would not be surprising, therefore, for a court disposed such
as the one in Watson to disregard the distinction between the owned and
non-owned situations. Moreover, in Kansas City Fire & Marine Ins. Co.
74. Id. at 763.
75. Id. at 764.
76. The Guillory court recognized the factual distinctions between the owned and
non-owned situation since they dismissed both Atkins and Elder as not being directly
on point.
77. 203 So. 2d at 764.
78. See p. 290 supra.

79. Id.
80. See p. 289 supra.
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v. Epperson,"' a case decided under the 1958 Family Policy, the court
failed to distinguish between the two situations because it considered that
distinction unimportant. 2 It is still possible for a court to make the same
comment when the 1963 Family Policy is in controversy. Although, technically, an insurance company should not be liable for double recovery
under the 1963 Family Policy when one of the insured cars is involved in
an accident, the possibility remains that a court will decide in favor of the
insured and allow pyramiding because of either a feeling of unfairness or
83
because of a failure to properly distinguish the factual situations.
C. Suggested Revisions
The foregoing considerations strongly suggest a need for further revisions of the medical payments section of the Standard Family Automobile Policy. Although there have been few attempts to pyramid medical
payments coverage, as the knowledge of the possibility of such action
becomes more widespread there is a probability that the number of attempts
to pyramid will increase. Additionally, despite the 1963 draft, there are
numerous policyholders of the 1958 version whose policies are annually
renewed without changing the policy to reflect revisions made after their
policy was initially issued. Since there is no indication that insurance
companies will vary this practice in the immediate future, it may reasonably
be assumed that even with further revisions of the 1963 Family Policy
the problem will not be entirely overcome. Nonetheless the drafting of
a more understandable policy is the starting point in clarifying the intent
of the insurer.
The Family Policy could be revised to include provisions similar to
those in the 1966 Standard Provisions for the General Automobile Liability
Policy,8 4 which were written after more than 9 years of study by the

National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters and the Mutual Insurance
Rating Bureau.8 5 Although these provisions were not intended to supersede the Family Policy, they serve to indicate that a similarly well constructed policy could also be drafted to rectify the problems arising
under the Family Policy.
The deletion of the separability clause, the basis for pyramiding attempts, from the Family Policy would eliminate a source of confusion as to
the type and amount of coverage provided. The 1966 Standard Provisions
do not contain a separability clause, yet provision is made for multiple car
coverage. This is effectuated by the use of a very broad insuring clause,
covering "each insured who sustains bodily injury, caused by accident,
while occupying or, while a pedestrian, through being struck by a highway
81. 234 Ark. 1100, 356 S.W.2d 613 (1962).
82. 234 Ark. at 1102, 356 S.W.2d at 614.
83. See p. 289 supra.
84. RISJORD at 265-72 (Supp. 1967).
85. 2 R. LONG, THt LAW op LIABILITY INSURANCE

§

1, app. at 30 (1966).
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vehicle."8 6 There are no restrictions with respect to cars owned by the
insured, but not mentioned in the policy. However, if the insurance industry wished to restrict coverage to include only owned automobiles for
which a premium is charged in the Family Policy, they could follow the
approach used by the Standard Provisions section which affords coverage
to persons other than the named insured. This division affords coverage:
[T]o or for each person who sustains bodily injury, caused by accident, while occupying a designated automobile which is being used by
a person for whom bodily injury liability insurance is afforded under
this policy with respect to such use

....

87

The designated automobile is then determined by reference to a schedule
which states the vehicles which are to be included in the term "designated
automobile." The policyholder may elect from a number of options which
automobiles are to be included in the term "designated automobile." 8 8 One
option includes any automobile described in the schedule.89 Thus, the
coverage is limited only to vehicles for which the insured pays a premium.
By this revision the insured would know exactly the extent of his coverage
and insurance companies would not have to concern themselves with
decisions allowing double recovery in the owned vehicle situation.
Notwithstanding the elimination of the separability clause by the use
of more precise language in the insuring clause to describe the automobile
for which coverage is afforded, all the ambiguities in the Family Policy
will not be overcome. There remains the problem of possible misunderstanding when the insured is injured while occupying a non-owned automobile or is struck as a pedestrian. It could still be argued that since
two cars are insured and neither is involved in the accident, the coverage
afforded by both should apply to allow pyramiding. This argument is
buttressed by the fact that the insured is paying an additional premium to
insure his second car.
This argument becomes more feasible when the case of Hansen v.
Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,90 is analyzed. In this case, the insured attempted to pyramid his medical payments and accidental death benefit
coverage even though there was no separability clause in his policy. The
Georgia court, the same court which decided Watson, refused to allow the
insured to pyramid his medical payments insurance, not only because of
the absence of the separability clause, but also because of the preciseness of
the limit of liability provision which states that "regardless of the number
of . . .automobiles . . . [to] which this policy applies . . . the limit for
Medical Expense Coverage . . ." will be the amount stated in the policy. 9 1

The importance of this provision was made apparent when the court
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

RIsJORO at 270 (Supp. 1967).
Id.
Id. at 202.
Id.
116 Ga. App. 528, 157 S.E.2d 768 (1967).
116 Ga. App. at 531, 157 S.E.2d at 770.
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permitted the insured to pyramid his accidental death payments coverage
because there was no specific limit on this coverage other than the monetary
limit for each named insured. Thus, the Hansen court found that the
policy provision relating to accidental death payments coverage must be
read as if separate policies for each car were written, thereby allowing
92
multiple recovery.
This problem could be alleviated by adding to the present limit of
liability provision a sentence similar to that added to the 1966 Standard
Provisions which reads: "When more than one medical payments coverage
afforded by this policy applies to the loss, the company shall not be liable
9 3'
for more than the amount of the highest applicable limit of liability.
This clause makes apparent to the reader of the policy that the insurance
company does not intend to insure the policyholder for more than the stated
limit of liability. A court in construing such a clause would not be justified
in allowing pyramiding on the basis of ambiguity. This phrase unequivocally
indicates to the insured that the coverage limit set forth in the policy is
the "highest applicable limit of liability."
The incorporation of these suggested revisions in the Family Policy
would aid both the insurer and the insured. The former would save the
costs of both suits and adverse judgments, and the insured would clearly
understand the exact nature of the coverage he has purchased.
III.

AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY

INSURANCE

The attempts to pyramid liability insurance have met with unanimous
disapproval in the courts. The one decision under the 1963 Family Policy
94
thoroughly analyzed the problem before deciding not to allow pyramiding.
The two decisions under the 1958 policy summarily reached the same result
by maintaining that the purpose of the separability clause was to assure the
application of the policy provisions to whichever automobile is involved
in the accident.9 5 Neither of the latter courts analyzed the insuring clause
to determine whether an ambiguity was present in the language of the policy.
The probable reason for the disapproval of pyramiding in the liability
area is the nature of this insurance coverage. Liability insurance is narrower than medical payments coverage because it does not extend beyond
the particular car causing the liability9 6 and because a prerequisite to the
insurer's obligation is that the insured be the cause of the injury.97 Since
the cause is necessarily associated with the operation of a particular
92. Id.
93. RiSJORD at 271 (Supp. 1967).

94. Greet v. Associated Indem. Corp., 371 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1967).
95. Polland v. Allstate Ins. Co., 25 App. Div. 2d 16, 266 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1966);
Pacific Indem. Co. v. Thompson, 56 Wash. 2d 715, 355 P.2d 12 (1960).
96. Medical payments insurance provides for broad coverage and has been likened
to accident insurance. Breen, The New Automobile Policy, 1955 INs. L.J. 328, 331.
Liability insurance, however, has traditionally been associated with a particular
automobile.
97. See Greer v. Associated Indem. Corp., 371 F.2d 29, 34 (5th Cir. 1967)
Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Sweet, 186 So. 2d 95, 97 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
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automobile, it would seem illogical to extend the coverage of a car not
involved in the accident to the vehicle which was in the accident. However, notwithstanding the different nature of liability insurance, there
remains the possibility that a policyholder could be misled by an ambiguity,
thereby requiring a decision against the insurer.
As in the discussion of medical payments insurance, the analysis of
the liability provisions of the Family Policy will focus on the 1958 policy
followed by discussion of the effect of the 1963 revisions. Separate treatment will again be given to the non-owned and owned automobile situations, and recommendations for revisions will follow.
A.

1958 Family Automobile Policy

The 1958 Family Policy divides the liability coverage into two parts:
Coverage A - Bodily Injury Liability, and Coverage B - Property Damage Liability. By the insuring clause the company agrees:
To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become
legally obligated to pay as damages because of
A. bodily injury.., sustained by any person;
B. injury to or destruction of property . . .arising out of the

ownership, maintenance or use of the owned automobile or
any non-owned automobile ....98

The definition of "owned automobile" is the same as was discussed with
reference to medical payments.09 Thus, on its face the policy coverage is
very broad. It covers the insured while driving any non-owned automobile
and the only indication that not all owned vehicles are included within
the policy is the use of the article the instead of an.
In addition there is a limit of liability provision which reads:
The limit of bodily injury liability stated in the declarations as
applicable to "each person"100 is the limit of the company's liability
for all damages, including damages for care and loss of services, arising out of bodily injury sustained by one person as the result of any
one occurrence; the limit of such liability stated in the declarations as
applicable to "each occurrence" is, subject to the above provision
respecting each person, the total limit of the company's liability for all
such damages arising out of bodily injury sustained by two or more
persons as the result of any one occurrence.
The limit of property damage liability stated in the declarations
as applicable to "each occurrence" is the total limit of the company's

liability for all damages . . . as the result of any one occurrence.1° 1

98. RISJORD at 56 (emphasis added).
99. See p. 286 supra.
100. For a case in which it was held that "each person" was not ambiguous, see
Valdez v. Interinsurance Exch. of the Auto. Club, 246 Cal. App. 1, 54 Cal. Rptr.
906 (1966).
101. RisjoRD at 61-62.
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This provision is similar to that used in the medical payments area. It
has language limiting coverage for any one occurrence to the amount
stated in the declarations, but again there is nothing which purports to
limit the coverage when more than one automobile is insured under the
policy. The declarations which are referred to are the same as those which
set forth the limit of medical payments coverage. It is important that the
language of the declarations be kept in mind. They read: "The limit of
the company's liability against each such coverage shall be as stated
herein,
10 2
subject to all the terms of this policy having reference thereto.
Since the separability clause is a term of the policy it applies to the
liability provisions 103 as well as the medical payments section. With these
provisions in mind it is now possible to analyze the pyramiding possibilities
in the liability insurance area.
The only case which involved an attempt to pyramid liability payments in the non-owned automobile situation was Polland v. Allstate Ins.
Co.104 In this case a "Crusader Policy," which is similar to the Family
Policy and includes a separability clause, was issued to the insured. The
court held in a one page opinion that this clause was not uncertain or
ambiguous, but only rendered the policy applicable to whichever car was
involved in an accident. 0 5
Although this no doubt was the purpose of the clause, it does not mean
that an ambiguity was not present. An insured, reading this portion of his
policy, would notice that he was covered while driving any non-owned
automobile. It is possible that the insured would be confused upon reading
the separability clause in conjunction with the limit of liability provisions
and the declarations which state that the limit of liability is to be read
"subject to all the terms of the policy having reference thereto."' 0 6 This
is especially true since he must pay an additional premium with no additional coverage in the non-owned automobile situation. This is essentially
the same problem as was present in the medical payments non-owned
automobile situation, 0 7 and, although the more restrictive nature of liability
insurance may be a justification for not allowing pyramiding in this area,
a summary dismissal of the ambiguity argument does not appear justified.
As in the non-owned automobile situation, there has been only one
case decided under the 1958 Family Policy interpreting the effect of the
separability clause in the owned automobile situation. In Pacific Indem.
Co. v. Thompson, 08 the court did not allow pyramiding on the basis
102. Id. at 54.
103. For a discussion of pyramiding bodily injury liability coverage under the
1955 Standard Provisions Policy, see Risjord, Pyramiding Automobile Policy Limits:
Giza and Piza, 9 FEDERATION INS. COUNStL Q., Spring, 1959, at 38.
104. 25 App. Div. 2d 16, 266 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1966).
105. 25 App. Div. 2d at 17, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 287.
106. See pp. 283-84 supra.
107. Id.
108. 56 Wash. 2d 715, 355 P.2d 12 (1960).
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that the specific limit of liability provision controlled the general separability clause. 10 9
Although the court in Thompson did not discuss ambiguity, it would
appear that this argument is not tenable for the following reasons." 0 In
addition to the general nature of liability insurance, which ordinarily
requires that a particular car be the cause of an accident before the insurance company is liable for damages arising out of the accident, the insuring
clause has specific language referring to the owned automobile. Upon
reading the policy the insured should realize that only when the owned
automobile is the cause of the accident will the insurer be liable. The
insurance coverage of the non-involved car could not be attributable to the
accident because it was not by the maintenance, operation, or ownership
of the non-involved car that the liability arose. A possible problem with
this argument is that the definition of owned automobile is broad enough
to include any owned automobile whether or not described in the policy."'
However, there remains the specific requirement that one and only one
car must be the cause of the accident.
B.

1963 Family Automobile Policy

In the 1963 revised Family Policy only one significant change was
made in the liability provision. The definition of "owned automobile" was
changed to read "'owned automobile' means a private passenger, farm or
utility automobile described in this policy for which a specific premium
charge indicates that coverage is afforded." 2 The requirement is still
present that an accident must be caused by the owned car, yet the policy
now states clearly and exactly the intended limit of coverage.
In the one decided case in this area, Greer v. Associated Indem.
Corp.,"' the court said of this change:
Far from aiding . . . [the insured] . . . the separability argument

now compels a holding adverse to her claim. Applying the separability
concept, the provision of the theoretical "separate policy" insuring
the noninvolved automobile could not possibly be interpreted to extend
coverage to the . . . [insured] . . . because her injuries did not arise

as the result of the "ownership, maintenance, or use of the owned
automobile . . . described in this policy

specific premium charge" is made.11 4

. . ."

and

"...

for which a

Since the only significant change in the 1963 policy pertaining to
liability coverage was the revised definition of "owned automobile," there
would be nothing to remove the possible ambiguity in the non-owned automobile situation.
109. 56 Wash. 2d at 716, 355 P.2d at 12.

110. But see 25 OHio L.J. 132, 136-37 (1964).
111. See pp. 287-89 supra.
112. RISJORD at 185-86 (emphasis added).
113. 371 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1967).
114. Id. at 33 (emphasis added).
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C.

Suggested Revisions

Since pyramiding has yet to be permitted in the liability insurance
area, it would appear that the need for revising the Family Policy with
respect to such coverage is less critical. However, this is not entirely true
because it is possible that a court, particularly in the non-owned vehicle
situation, could find an ambiguity and allow pyramiding. If this were done,
the insurance industry would suffer more adverse consequences than when
medical payments are involved. Medical payments coverage usually has
a $2,000 limit per person, whereas liability coverage for property damage
is likely to be $5,000 and liability for personal injury insurance is commonly set at $10,000 to $100,000 per person. 115 Therefore, as the possibility
of pyramiding becomes better understood and more well known, an insurance company could very easily find itself obligated to pay double this
higher limit of liability.
As in the medical payments area, the deletion of the separability clause
would be a significant step in clarifying the insurer's intent. In addition,
in the owned automobile situation, the 1966 Standard Provisions suggest
the manner to provide for the multiple automobile coverage by using the
designated automobile approach." 6 The 1966 Standard Provisions also
suggest an addition to the limit of liability provision which would clarify
the intended coverage in the non-owned vehicle situation. This clause
states in part that regardless of the number of automobiles to which the
117
policy applies the limit shall be that set forth in the declarations.
By implementing these suggested revisions the insurance industry could
avoid several potential problems.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing discussion indicates the confusion and uncertainty
which has arisen because of poorly drafted policy provisions. At present,
neither insurance companies nor policyholders can be certain of the coverage provided by the Family Automobile Policy. Since the question has
only arisen in ten cases in different jurisdictions, the problem is in its
embryonic stages. The insurance industry, therefore, would be well advised
to take the necessary steps to resolve this problem before it multiplies
throughout the nation. Before the problem is resolved, however, the
courts which must settle future controversies should make an effort to
reach their decisions based on sound principles of insurance law after a
thorough study of the policy and the factual situation before them.
Edward J. Ciechon, Jr.
115. See 25 OHIo L.J. 132, 136 (1964).
116. RISJORD at 265 (Supp. 1967) ; see p. 294 supra.
117. Id. at 267.
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